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LOAN-LOSS RECOGNITION BY BANKS: PUMPS IN THE REAR-VIEW, BUMPS AHEAD 
Retail lending is still at the core of the banking business, and obviously accepting and 
managing credit risk represents a critical function of banks. Recognition of loan losses is 
a crucial part of that exercise, due to the high sensitivity of a bank’s financial position to 
changes in the value of loans. However, neither managerial attitude nor accounting 
standards have facilitated market discipline in this domain up to now: a strict interpretation 
of IAS 39 has been used as an excuse by banks to avoid recognizing the impact of risks 
stemming from lenient practices and undue growth strategies.
In order to provide users of financial statements with useful and reliable information on the 
financial impact of retail lending exposures, the peculiarities of the banking business have 
to be considered. This article looks at current practices in the area of retail lending, and 
analyzes how those practices affect the estimation of loan losses. It then attempts to bring 
clarity on some common beliefs that have traditionally affected loan-loss accounting.
With all the arguments at hand, a suggested framework for the production of useful and 
relevant loan-loss information is presented. The framework is based on the assumption 
that loan losses accrue as credit risk builds up in respect of a loan or a group of loans. In 
the context of retail lending by banks, this means losses not only respond to credit quality 
deterioration, but also to the way loans are granted. 
London, summer of 1854. The Soho District was then a vastly populated neighborhood 
lacking the most basic sanitary services to cater for the flow of waste. In the lack of a 
sewerage system for the area many houses got rid of their debris by means of cesspits 
that were easily overrun, so authorities decided to dump the waste into the Thames.
By that time, Asian cholera was well known by Londoners, and it was a general belief that it 
spread through aerial means. However, evidence led Dr. John Snow, an anesthesiologist 
interested in the study of diseases, to locate the source of that summer’s outbreak at the 
water pump on Broad Street. Though microscopic examination of a water sample was not 
conclusive, his analysis of the epidemic’s pattern, including a mapping of cases showing high 
concentration in the pump’s surroundings, convinced local authorities to seal the well pump.
The outbreak took away more than 600 lives and raised the mortality rate to nearly 13% in 
some parts of London, but it clearly represented a turning point in the investigation of 
epidemics and its causes, influencing public health measures throughout the world.1 
Very much like cholera did with the water supplies credit risk contaminates cash flows. 
Banks carry out an important social function by accepting, pricing and transforming credit 
risk, which can be generally described as “the possibility that the borrower will fail to repay 
as promised”.2 Owing to their substantial leverage, inadequate estimation of this risk’s 
1  Introduction. Pumps 
in the rear-view mirror
1  See Johnson (2006).
2 See for instance Walter (1991).
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impact can have damaging consequences, since even small punches involving unforeseen 
losses on credit exposures could potentially knock any big bank down.3
As a result, adequately estimating how the exposure to credit risk affects the value of loans, 
and therefore the bank’s financial position, should be at the forefront of priorities both for its 
managers and users of financial statements. In turn, it is the role of prudential authorities to 
ensure the adequate foundations for such estimation, which should be framed within the 
bank’s credit risk management and thus be a natural consequence of how bank managers:
a) identify the credit risk in the bank’s transactions or activities; and
b) price the related instruments based on the initially estimated impact of such risk.
When this process is followed, loan losses accrue in response to both changes in such initial 
estimate and inadequate consideration of risk factors. In this case, the impact of credit risk 
responds not only to credit quality deterioration, but also inadequate identification or pricing.
Existing accounting standards require the loss to be evidenced by an event in order to 
report it on the financial statements. A word-by-word interpretation of such requirement 
has led banks to recognizing credit losses solely in response to credit quality deterioration 
owing to borrower creditworthiness concerns or general economic circumstances affecting 
repayment prospects. The financial crisis brought the issue to the attention of G20 leaders, 
which in 2009 called on accounting standard setters to replace such “incurred loss” 
framework by a model that incorporated a wider range of information and thus avoided 
“too little” loss estimation and “too late” loss recognition. However, conceptual 
disagreement has affected such endeavor by the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB).4 The result is an 
“expected loss” model which may still be subject to substantial interpretive concerns.
In this context, the aim of this article is threefold:
1 Analyzing the peculiarities of retail lending by banks.
2 Based on that analysis, dismantling some of the widespread assumptions 
that traditionally have surrounded the issue of loan-loss provisioning.
3 Backed by the findings in such exercise, presenting a framework for the 
estimation and recognition of loan losses by banks that: a) considers the referred 
peculiarities; and b) is consistent with the fundamental concepts of accounting.
3  According to Hoenig (2013), most of the world’s largest “systemic” banks operate under extreme leverage, as 
shown by their capital ratios if calculated on the basis of accounting, rather than risk-based figures. Building on 
his analysis, the three banks which at end-2012 showed the highest Tier 1 Capital Ratio (average 16.61%) 
showed a bare 2.46% “Adjusted Accounting Capital” ratio, the calculation of which eliminates the risk-weighting 
of assets in the ratio’s denominator and includes all loss-absorbing resources in the numerator (by subtracting 
goodwill, other intangibles and deferred tax assets from Total Equity and Total Assets). The ratio was even lower 
in the preceding years, bordering a nearly gaseous state at end-2008 (average 0.84%, meaning that each euro 
of the total assets for those three banks was funded with less than a cent of risk capital). This has been the 
common picture for large banks, and it implies that loss-absorbing resources would only endure a small write-
down of their retail loan portfolios (again looking at the three above, adjusted Total Equity at end-2012 would only 
have been capable of sustaining a 5.90% to 12.20% adjustment on their net loans to customers).
4  Examples of such disagreement are found all throughout the process of replacing the incurred loss framework. 
See for instance International Accounting Standards Board (2013a), pp. 7-9. For a snapshot on the final clash 
between both Boards, refer to Financial Accounting Foundation (2012).
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The application of the proposed framework would arguably enhance transparency on the 
value of loans. Although investors are designated by both the IASB and FASB as the primary 
addressees of financial information, their main concerns (“delayed recognition of losses”, 
“systematic under-reserving… of the expected losses”, or “inability… to use forward 
looking information to recognize expected credit losses”)5  are shared by other stakeholders, 
mainly prudential authorities. In this sense, the framework would not only facilitate the 
adoption of decisions by investors, but also guide the efforts of those authorities in providing 
bank managers with sound criteria for the estimation and recognition of loan losses.6
Starting from a succinct description of how banks account for loan losses in Section 2, 
Section 3 develops the first of the objectives presented above.
Sections 4 to 8 tackle the second objective, with the following detail:
 — Section 4 addresses how loans are priced by banks, while Section 5 discusses 
the connected issue of an individual loan’s fair value upon initial recognition 
when that loan is managed on a portfolio basis.
— Section 6 analyzes the timing of loss recognition in the context of existing 
assumptions by accountants.
— Section 7 counters the traditional arguments on the pro-cyclicality of loan-
loss accounting, alongside other macroeconomic implications.
— Section 8 presents the shortcomings of extensive use of data and statistics 
for loss estimation purposes.
Section 9 builds on the arguments in the article to present the suggested framework as 
described in the third objective above, while Section 10 provides the main conclusions 
and current prospects for loan-loss accounting.
Like any other asset, the estimation of a loan’s value depends on its lifetime expected cash 
flows. In the case of loans, those cash flows are particularly influenced by credit risk so in 
the end a loan’s value is basically dependent on the expected cash shortfalls to the 
contractual amounts due. Accordingly, adequate information on a bank’s financial position 
should include an appropriate estimation of those shortfalls and their discounted value.
Obviously this involves a substantial degree of management estimation. The allowance for 
loan losses deals with future cash shortfalls arising from current exposure. Accordingly, 
recognizing credit losses implies accruing the foreseen effects of events that affect an 
exposure, which means correcting the book value of the financial asset.7 
While a substantial degree of discretion is unavoidable in estimating loan losses and 
determining when they accrue, most of the balance sheet of traditional banks is made up 
2  Accounting for loan 
losses by banks. 
A basic primer
5  See Financial Accounting Standards Board (2013).
6  These criteria should be part of wider efforts by prudential authorities regarding the full credit risk management 
process. In this regard, many prudential authorities already provide guidance on loan-loss estimation and 
recognition in the current incurred-loss environment. Moreover, as of the writing of this article the Basel 
Committee’s Accounting Experts Group is updating its own guidance in the context of the new accounting 
standards for loan-loss provisioning.
7  In turn, final confirmation of the shortfall involves the asset’s write-off (which however does not imply legal 
surrender of the claim against the borrower).
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of large groups of small, homogeneous loans (such as consumer or residential mortgage 
loans) representative of the bank’s retail lending business. These assets are managed on 
a group basis, rather than individually. In trying to estimate their credit losses Dr. Snow’s 
analysis of the viral process described in the introduction is illustrative. Like in the 1854 
epidemics, where the outbreak’s pattern evidenced a concentration of events in the vicinity 
of Broad Street, historical information for groups of loans similar to the group being 
assessed can be enlightening on the trends and behavioral patterns that led to observed 
defaults and the resulting cash shortfalls of borrowers therein.
The collection and analysis of such information for similar portfolios provides the stepping 
stone for the estimation of loan losses. In the context of an increased use of mathematical 
tools in finance there may be a temptation to rely exclusively on that type of information for 
undisputable answers, very much like some kind of Delphic oracle. But in reality, even the 
most granular set of data, filtered by the most sophisticated statistical model, might be 
useless in predicting what is yet to come. All relevant information must be considered, and 
every indicator has to be carefully assessed.
Obviously banks have an incentive to limit the range of information being considered on top of 
historically evidenced patterns. Discretion in determining the loan-loss allowance levels 
incentivizes its use as a “smoothing” mechanism to manage earnings through the overstatement 
or understatement of such allowance. The linking of loss recognition to a narrow, interpretive 
set of trigger events as per the incurred loss framework has facilitated this.8 
On the contrary, users of financial statements adjust estimates based on historical figures 
with a wide range of available information (on portfolio characteristics, borrower 
performance, and economic circumstances) to take account of both current and foreseen 
events and circumstances that are thought to impact payment behavior.9
So accounting for loan losses currently follows either a preparer or a user approach.10 
This speaks of a debate that revolves around an expected, rather than incurred loss 
notion.
While both approaches involve a high degree of judgment in substantiating such notion, 
the use of discretion by managers should be avoided if merely aimed at attaining their own 
goals at the expense of depositors. This is not a task for the accounting standard setters, 
but rather for prudential authorities in steering the credit risk management process. 
Regulation and supervision should provide banks with the correct incentives for the 
identification of risks, the pricing of loans commensurate with initially estimated losses, 
and the subsequent estimation and recognition of loan losses, whether they stem from 
changes in initial estimates, or inadequate identification of credit risk or loan pricing.
8   Inconsistent application of IAS 39 requirements for the estimation and recognition of loan losses, coupled with 
inadequate revision and enforcement, are considered determining factors in its use by banks to postpone 
losses. See for instance International Accounting Standards Board (2014).
9   This is systematically confirmed by investors when questioned on their analysis of bank loan-loss allowances. 
Outreach by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (2013) gathered views noting that investors “spend vast 
amounts of time analyzing the allowance for credit losses, in conjunction with information about the credit 
quality of the portfolio”, and that their analyses “aim to adjust the reported amounts for the analyst’s forecast of 
all the… expected credit losses”.
10  A similar classification can be found in Wall and Koch (2000), who distinguish an economic view capturing 
expected losses, an accounting perspective that excludes the expected effect of future events, and a regulatory 
approach which considers the allowance as a buffer built during good times to absorb losses during bad times. 
While the accounting perspective matches the preparer approach, the user approach would encompass the 
needs of anyone interested in estimating the value of loan portfolios, including regulators.
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There is still no consensus on how financial statements should depict credit losses that affect 
the value of loans and the bank’s performance. As discussed, the debate between users and 
preparers revolves around the notion of “expected credit losses”, which can be described as 
“estimated losses on a loan portfolio over the life of the loans”.11 It is fair to say that a general 
state of confusion surrounds both the notion’s meaning and the extent to which expected 
losses (whatever their estimate amounts to) are to be recognized on the financial statements.
In any case, when dealing with expected losses it has to be clear that a bank’s exposure to 
credit risk stemming from its retail lending business cannot be compared to the exposures 
linked to other types of businesses. This differentiation affects the whole process of credit 
risk management, from loan underwriting practices to credit risk identification, initial loss 
estimation and the resulting pricing of loans, to the monitoring of payment capacity, 
collection efforts, and ensuing loan-loss recognition. It also explains the title to this section.
If we focus on their retail lending activity, it is clear that banks operate within a mature 
industry selling a plain, non-distinguishable product such as credit. Obtaining the loan 
from one bank or another makes no difference to a borrower, so bank managers faced with 
high competitive pressure have a natural incentive to sacrifice margin in order not to lose 
a borrower (and the prospects for cross-selling of products) to another bank. This makes 
bank earnings essentially dependent on volume. Bluntly, the nature of their product and 
the characteristics of their business force banks to grant loans inattentively of individual 
borrower repayment prospects.12 
That simple fact is often disregarded by advocates of the preparer approach when 
considering how credit risk builds up and evolves. But the way in which a bank originates 
a consumer or residential real-estate mortgage loan cannot be put on a level with how 
other companies grant credit or purchase financial assets. Neither can it be compared with 
other lending activities conducted by the bank itself, such as corporate lending.
The reason for this difference has already been discussed: assets comprising a bank’s retail 
lending business are small, homogeneous loans originated and managed on a portfolio 
basis.13 In order to decide on each loan application, borrowers are scored on the basis of a 
series of general criteria that try to capture their common expected behavior. Ideally, the 
scoring model should explore a wide range of performance characteristics concerning what 
is usually referred to as the “five Cs”: character, capacity, capital, conditions, and collateral.14 
But as stated by Henderson (2009), credit scoring models are not devised as tools to discern 
individual borrower creditworthiness, but rather “as tools to rank order the performance 
characteristics of the population” in order to facilitate “automated decision mechanisms”.
Detailed borrower analysis on an individual basis is simply ruled out in order to facilitate 
the lending decision. This has contributed to “dramatic” loan growth based on the 
underwriting of products with standardized conditions.15 It might be assumed banks have 




11 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009).
12  Commercial bank advertising campaigns provide evidence of such behavior: a quick browse through the web 
pages of many big banks leads to useful tools that find the best-suited, plain product with pre-specified terms 
based solely on the property appraised value and the requested amount.
13  According to the International Accounting Standards Board (2011a), “portfolios” can be defined as a “grouping 
of financial assets with similar characteristics that are managed by a reporting entity on a collective basis”. Bank 
portfolios can be described as “open”, because “assets are added to the portfolio through its life by origination 
or purchase, and removed through its life by write-offs, transfer to other portfolios, sales and repayment”.
14  However, as indicated in footnote 12, the initial filter is usually focused on the last “C”, and more particularly on 
loan-to-appraised value (LTV).
15 See Henderson (2009).
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leeway to adjust for initial concerns on a particular borrower’s creditworthiness by requiring 
a higher compensation, tightening the loan’s conditions, or simply rejecting the application. 
But because retail lending is based on offering credit en masse, the loan will normally be 
granted as long as the applicant meets the group’s inclusion criteria (i.e., the minimum 
score). That loan’s conditions (e.g., its amortization period, repayment schedule, collateral 
type and requirements, down payments, or the loan’s price) are not tailored to each 
individual borrower’s credit status, but rather standardized on the basis of the risk 
characteristics that are common to borrowers in the group.16 
This basic feature of the retail lending business does not mean credit risk is ignored. 
Indeed the group’s overall repayment prospects are considered, and contractual returns 
on loan portfolios should be commensurate with the identified credit risk. At least 
theoretically, when considered within a group the cash flows from borrowers expected to 
meet contractual payments compensate cash shortfalls from those expected to fail in 
honoring their obligations.
However, the tendency of banks to underestimate or underprice credit risk makes such 
compensation unlikely in practice. This has been repeatedly pointed out by the US Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC),17 and follows from a natural incentive of bank 
managers to game the referred theoretical balance in the search for increased profits. As 
already explained, the profitability of a bank’s retail lending business depends basically on 
volume, so banks accept the risk of incorporating bad borrowers as a side effect of 
standardized, prêt-a-porter lending intended to boost profits.
With all banks engaged in retail lending being subject to the same incentive, a degree of 
competition is unavoidable. Banks compete for share, so they have to differentiate 
somehow in order to attract borrowers to their non-distinguishable product. So called 
“asset wars” are usually based on interest rate cuts. But relaxing loan conditions represents 
an alternative to directly sacrificing margin. This is particularly frequent during upturns, 
where borrower repayment prospects are overestimated.
The paradigmatic example of this practice is very recent and cruel: in the years preceding 
the crisis, newspapers were covered in adds offering loans subject to scarce or no 
verification of income sources, imaginative means of stretching borrower income, and 
based on the mantra that collateral appraisal values would stand for any difficulty in a 
context of ever-rising prices. Still today it is not infrequent to find loans being granted with 
substantial deferrals of principal repayment, flexible amortization schedules, no down 
payments, or excessive commitments with respect to the price of the financed asset. 
Concessions and refinancing, which were once useful tools to ease the difficulties of 
otherwise solvent borrowers, seem to be now devised as mere leaps in the dark.18
16  In practice, the only way a bank adjusts for a particular borrower’s riskiness is by means of requiring additional 
collateral or guarantees. But absolute limitations in a borrower’s encumbrance capacity (either through property 
to pledge or valid guarantors) might tempt managers to overshoot the value of collateral backing the loan. 
Favorable economic conditions are the perfect setting for these questionable valuation practices, which 
specially affect collateral subject to independent appraisals, such as real-estate that backs mortgage loans.
17  As a matter of fact, it represents an essential criterion for its supervision of US national banks and thrift 
institutions, which is embedded in its “Comptroller Handbooks”. For a more detailed explanation, see Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency (1998), pp. 15-17.
18  HSBC (2014) reports how it offers “a wide range of mortgage products designed to meet customer needs, 
including capital repayment, interest-only, affordability and offset mortgages”. It also explains how, although 
LTV thresholds and debt-to-income ratios “must comply with Group policy, strategy and risk appetite… they 
differ in the various locations in which we operate to reflect the local economic and housing market conditions, 
regulations, portfolio performance, pricing and other product features”.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 141 ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 27
— Lacking or inadequate verification of borrower income. Even if 
automated systems are used to initially grade loan applications 
on the basis of simple parameters, the final lending decision 
should avail of some basic information aimed at verifying the 
borrower’s capacity. Until very recently income verification has 
not been generally required, and origination of “low-doc” or 
“no-doc” loans has been usual in some jurisdictions.1 As an 
alternative to these, “Alt-A” loans were characterized by less 
than full documentation, lower credit scores, higher LTV, or the 
pledge of additional collateral.
— Inadequate debt service coverage. Banks should ensure the 
borrower has enough discretionary, recurring income to face 
payments and standard living expenses. However, loans are 
typically granted based on the loan-to-income (LTI) ratio,2 
rather than net available income. Furthermore the decisions 
are based on past and current, rather than expected income, 
so banks are confronted with borrowers who were considered 
to withstand huge leverage but became unable to face loan 
payments upon the turn of the tide.
— Unrealistic mortgage installments. Instead of defining reasonable 
terms taking into account the borrower’s repayment capacity, 
products can be designed with the sole aim of stretching 
affordability. Examples are loans granted with relieved repayment 
schedules, interest-only payments, or even flexible payment 
options giving way to negative amortization (such as adjustable-
rate-mortgages, “ARMs”).
— Excessive reliance on collateral and collateral valuation. Equity 
buffers tend to vanish precisely as a bank’s incentives to 
foreclose on the pledged assets rise, so collateral should 
never be considered a primary source of repayment, nor drive 
lending decisions. In this connection, LTV caps are not 
effective tools for risk mitigation, particularly within favorable 
economic environments.3 Originating loans at excessive LTVs 
(which even exceeded 100% in the run-up to the crisis) 
eliminates any eventual buffer and discourages repayment.
 Additionally, home equity lines of credit (“HELOCs”) are 
granted based on the borrower’s equity in a previously 
financed property, or either on the basis of a foreseen house 
price appreciation.
— Multiple layering of risks. Some banks go a step beyond by 
originating products that combine two or more of the above 
features (e.g., interest-only loans with reduced documentation, 
ARMs at 100% LTV, or first lien mortgage loans to high LTI 
borrowers combined with simultaneous HELOCs or second liens).4 
— Inappropriate use of mortgage insurance. The transfer of 
credit risk from lenders to mortgage insurers provides 
additional financing flexibility and can prove useful in risk 
mitigation if coupled with a prudent assessment of both the 
borrower and the insurer’s creditworthiness. However, it has 
also been used as a tool to dodge sound underwriting.5 
BOX 1TYPICAL AVENUES FOR THE RELAXATION OF LOAN CONDITIONS
A review of typical mortgage loan underwriting practices which follow patterns like those 
described above is provided by the Financial Stability Board (2011). Box 1 attempts at 
establishing a basic classification of those practices.
So en masse and prêt-a-porter define the retail lending business of banks, leading to an 
increase in their risk profile. This equates to failure in risk identification, loan pricing, or 
both, and inevitably has a consequence in terms of loan-loss information and the depiction 
of a bank’s financial position.
By promoting sound underwriting standards and trying to steer the way banks define their 
credit policies, prudential authorities have long sought to mitigate the harmful incentives 
leading to such failure.19 But with management compensation still being based 
19  One of the most prominent examples can be found in guidance by the Financial Stability Board (2012). Also the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006) has attempted to drive sound credit risk management policies.
3  Regardless of that fact, raising the bar is typically considered acceptable 
if the appraised value (or the long-term economic value) of collateral 
caters for the expected cash shortfall (refer to footnote 16).
4 See US Regulatory Agencies (2006).
5 See Joint Forum (2013).
1  A market for low-doc (“non-conforming”) mortgage loans existed in the 
US and UK whereby borrowers were willing to compensate for the higher 
risk of not documenting income sources. However, in the run-up to the 
financial crisis many banks were broadly originating those loans with no 
compensation, both as an interim step to ensuing securitization, or with an 
aim to holding them for collection. As an example, a few banks originated 
and purchased non-conforming first and second lien real-estate secured 
loans, some of which were sourced by independent mortgage brokers.
2  LTI measures loan servicing requirements as a percentage of income 
available to repay the loan.
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fundamentally on short-term performance, the main problem lays not so much on increased 
risk but rather failure to show its consequences on the face of the financial statements. 
Arguably a transparent depiction of a bank’s expected credit losses and the resulting 
impact on its financial position would enhance market discipline and indirectly force banks 
towards a more prudent stance to loan underwriting.
Where this link between loan origination, pricing, and the booking of losses is not 
considered by accounting standards, it should also be the subject of guidelines by 
prudential authorities. As explained in the introduction, the ultimate purpose of this article 
is precisely to present a framework that can guide those initiatives, or more generally the 
approach to loan-loss estimation and recognition by preparers and users of bank financial 
statements.20 
In any case, being aware of the peculiarities described in this section is key to understanding 
how credit risk affects a bank’s financial position, and accordingly how it should be shown 
on its financial statements. It also allows a revision of some of the myths in which the area 
of credit risk, and particularly loan-loss accounting, seems to be shrouded. 
As described in the introductory section, the estimation and recognition of loan losses 
should follow a process that starts with the identification of credit risk inherent in loan 
exposures and the pricing of those exposures based on the initially estimated impact of 
risk identified. The first of widespread beliefs that can be dismantled precisely refers to the 
adequacy of loan pricing.
The Oxford Dictionary of British and World English defines the noun “price” as “the amount 
of money expected, required, or given in payment for something”, while the verb “price” 
means: a) “to decide the amount required as payment for something offered for sale”; or 
alternatively b) “to discover or establish the price of something for sale”.
Banks are assumed to adequately price financial assets, including loans. According to the 
above definitions of the verb “price”, that would imply they are either successful in “price 
discovery” [meaning b)], or in “product pricing” [meaning a)]. While price discovery for 
actively traded financial assets (such as equities or debt securities) is straightforward and 
reliant only on market depth,21 it is not at all easy to find out the amount of money a 
borrower would be willing to give in payment for a loan (i.e., the loan’s price). Accordingly, 
when granting loans managers focus on deciding the amount required as payment (i.e., 
product pricing) rather than trying to discover a loan’s price which both themselves and 
the borrower would consider appropriate.
When the priced product is credit itself, as is the case for loans and financial assets in 
general, the amount required in payment is called “interest”, so in this context pricing is 
about determining interest charged in exchange for the amount lent. That should not be 
difficult if a company’s lending activities are subordinate to its main business, like in the 
case of a manufacturer granting payment deferral to a client: interest charged (i.e., the price 
for the deferral) is based on thoughtful analysis of the client’s payment capacity, in turn 
rooted in an adequate understanding of its business, even enhanced by data on payment 
history in cases of ongoing affairs.
4  The “magic” 
of loan pricing
20  More detail is presented in Section 9.
21  As stated by the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (2013), debt securities have readily determinable fair 
values which reflect “the market’s estimate of credit losses”.
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A simple example can illustrate how the deferral would be priced. Imagine a company sold 
industrial equipment and allowed a well-known customer to defer a 1,000€ payment one 
year. History shows an average 3% cash shortfall for similar transactions, and the company 
expects to earn a 60€ return (covering time value of money, funding costs and overheads, 
plus a profit margin). Accordingly the price for the deferral is set at 90€, which includes 30€ 
of estimated cash shortfall. In other words, although the sole contractual cash flow due in 
one year is established at 1,090€, the expected cash flow is 1,060€.
Things change when exposure to the credit risk of wide groups of retail borrowers represents 
the core of a company’s business, as is the case for banks. Expectations of cash shortfalls 
for the group as a whole are indeed considered when underwriting the loans that comprise it. 
However, the described peculiarities of the banking business make it difficult to assume 
that the price of any particular loan within the group is fully reflective of individual 
creditworthiness concerns. In fact banks themselves recognize that loan pricing cannot be 
perfect, and not surprisingly evidence shows they tend to misprice credit risk.22 
We may use the numbers in the example above for a group of homogeneous loans. If 
diversification benefits from pooling the risk of individual borrowers resulted in an average 
3% cash shortfall expected for the portfolio as a whole, this would imply keeping the 
price at 90€ despite higher shortfall expectations being possible for any particular 
borrower. The sole contractual cash flow would still be 1,090€ even if cash shortfalls in 
excess of the 30€ priced were expected. For instance, if the expected cash shortfall for a 
single loan climbed to 70€, its return would be cut to 20€, but overall the bank would still 
be expecting a 6% return on the portfolio because, in average, cash shortfalls on worst-
performing loans would be theoretically compensated by cash flows on the performing 
(i.e., borrowers that repaid 1,090€, or at least above 1,060€).
As explained in the previous section, just lending to borrowers initially expected to perform 
would mean losing clients and thus prospects for product cross-selling and further 
engagement. So a bank typically risks adverse selection for the sake of market share.
This example shows that the price for a single, risky loan within the portfolio is not adjusted, 
thus leading to underpriced risk for that loan. But how is that price arrived at? What can 
we say about the process for pricing retail loans?
As indicated, the price for an individual loan should cover time value of money, funding costs 
and overheads, plus a margin encompassing the risk premium. Funding costs are readily 
observable and can easily be incorporated into the price, while overheads present more 
difficulties because usually banks do not have strong cost accounting systems.23 This leaves 
risk as the key to the pricing dilemma and margin as the lever banks use to compete. Their 
natural incentive to venture into new business and relax conditions in order to gain market 
share leads to a narrowing of margins.24 As indicated by the Office of the Comptroller of the 
22  Research by Barclays has found that banks systematically miscalculate the riskiness of loans they originate 
[see Masters (2013)].
23  See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (1998).
24  Examples of this can be found in different jurisdictions and for different products. Nawaz and Khan (2014) report 
a steady fall in US auto loan rates “as auto lenders aggressively compete for business”. One of the CEOs of 
banks involved justifies their raid into the business despite it involving “lousier collateral and less quality 
customers”. Crespo (2014) reports how the incipient economic recovery in Spain is spurring competition among 
banks for market share, which is making loans to households and small and medium-sized companies cheaper. 
With solvent demand for credit still being limited, bank managers are concerned about the likely hit on their 
income statements, but they accept the price cut as an unavoidable requirement to remain in the market.
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Currency (1998), loan pricing is still “clouded” by banks incorporating other benefits 
“attributed to the lending relationship into the loan pricing decision”, despite developments 
in credit risk management. Goldman Sachs (2008) affirms to “have experienced, due to 
competitive factors, pressure to extend and price credit at levels that may not always fully 
compensate us for the risks we take”.
In his renowned study on asymmetric information, Akerlof (1970) explained how “the bad cars 
tend to drive out the good, in much the same way that bad money drives out the good”. 
Adverse borrower selection, which is inherent to the banking business, is increased even 
further during upturns owing to the relaxed underwriting standards and underestimated risks.
This may seem at odds with the argument by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) that banks respond 
to adverse selection through credit rationing. However, it has to be observed that such 
argument is based on the bank’s ability to discriminate high-risk borrowers.25 While it may 
be valid for corporate lending where borrowers are indeed analyzed individually, scoring 
systems used in the retail business cannot provide information at the borrower level that is 
sufficiently detailed to drive rejection of applications, or any kind of compensation through 
a tightening of other loan conditions (e.g., higher down payments or reduced terms).26  
Accounting standards define fair value as “the price that would be received to sell an asset 
or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the 
measurement date”.27 Just as banks are assumed to adequately price loans, a second, 
complementary, widespread belief is that the amount lent equals the loan’s fair value at 
origination.
However, as explained in the previous section, it is very difficult to find out the amount of 
money on which the borrower and the bank would be willing to come to terms regarding 
the loan. So in fact lending at the exact fair value is as utopian as accurately pricing loan 
losses. It would require considering all circumstances that affect future cash flows but, 
recalling the described pricing process, it happens to be the case that:
a) the loan’s price is not tailored to each borrower’s credit status, but instead reflects 
general loss expectations for the group of loans considered as a whole; and
b) owing to the nature of the retail lending business commercial considerations 
tend to outweigh prudence to the extent that final return might even fall short 
of that capturing initial credit risk expectations for the group.
Using the example in Section 4, the contractual 9% rate incorporates a 3% risk premium 
reflective of the expected 30€ cash shortfall included in each loan’s price. Fair value would 
thus result from discounting the expected cash flow at a 6% rate which excludes the 
initially priced-in risk.
In other words, the fair value of any individual loan within the portfolio would reflect 
expected cash shortfalls and discount them at the original, risk-free effective interest rate, 
5 Matching the fair value
25  Despite recognizing that such discrimination may be accomplished through a variety of “screening devices”, 
Stiglitz and Weiss focus on the potential borrower’s willingness to pay higher interest rates.
26  The credit rationing argument may also be valid for a bank’s retail business at times when the incentives to gain 
volume are not so pressing. For instance, during economic downturns potential borrowers are screened more 
closely, and indicators like the one studied by Stiglitz and Weiss may drive a bank’s decision to reject an application.
27 IFRS 13, paragraph 9.
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with any difference between the amount lent and fair value corresponding to the discounted 
extra shortfalls which had not been included in the loan’s price. In the example, those 
shortfalls make the expected cash flow descend to 1,020€ for a particular risky loan within 
the portfolio (1,090€ contractual cash flow, reduced by the 70€ expected cash shortfall), 
so that its fair value of 962€ reflects the 40 € extra shortfalls (70€ shortfall for the particular 
risky borrower, in excess of the 30€, priced-in shortfall) discounted at the 6% rate.
Fair value = 1,020€ × a16% ≈ 962€
Amount lent – Fair value = 1,000€ – 962€ = 40€ × a16% = 38€
Straightforward as it may seem, many struggle with the apparent contradiction: Why would 
anyone be willing to give up yield? Why would a bank make extra losses at inception of 
the loan? This question is especially puzzling for accountants, who require fair value as the 
initial measurement basis for any financial asset.28 However, application of IAS 39 and US 
GAAP shows that even within the incurred loss framework it has not been unusual to see 
losses being recognized upon origination for assets added to an open portfolio (either in 
the form of “general” provisions, or as so called “incurred but not reported” losses). 
Recalling that fact, while revising the loan-loss accounting model the IASB Staff 
recommended that the allowance balance incorporates “expected losses which have not 
yet materialized” for assets “on which no meaningful deterioration has occurred”, even at 
inception of the loan.29 
Furthermore, when competitive pressure results in risk premia falling short of those 
required to cover initially expected losses, the cash flows from performing loans no longer 
suffice to compensate shortfalls expected on the non-performing. Does that couple with 
fair value equaling the amount lent for every single loan within a portfolio? A value 
adjustment would also be justified reflecting the un-priced features affecting the 
performance of loans. How does this match with the assumption by accountants?
There is no need digging deep to solve the riddle. Besides the definition included at the 
beginning of this section, IFRS clearly state that the fair value of a financial instrument at 
initial recognition is “normally” the transaction price meaning that, for instance, when a 
loan is granted at below market interest rates its fair value reflects “the prevailing market 
rate” with any additional amount lent being treated as “an expense or a reduction of 
income unless it qualifies for recognition as some other type of asset”.30 Though no active 
market generally exists for retail loans, their fair value would respond to initial credit risk 
expectations for the group of loans, while the remaining up to the amount lent would be 
the day-one loss resulting from lending at a premium falling short of that required to cover 
those expectations. 
The rational explanation for such behavior typically observed in banks is that part of the 
amount lent is in fact consideration for keeping up with competitors in terms of share. In 
other words, the “prevailing market rate” should in this case be referred as a “required 
entry” rate. This must have an impact on day one.
28  According to the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (2013), the economics of the lending business 
collide with recognizing loan losses on “day one”. Also the IASB’s Chairman Hans Hoogervorst (2012b) has 
stressed that “when a loan is made on market terms, at inception a loss is not suffered” and that recognizing 
“lifetime losses on day one could bring the book value of a loan (significantly) below its economic value”.
29  See International Accounting Standards Board (2011b).
30  IAS 39, paragraph AG64, and IFRS 9, paragraph B5.1.1.
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Day-one losses being the sum of all un-priced, discounted expected shortfalls, their 
consideration indeed allows recognition of the loan’s “lifetime losses” as estimated at 
inception. Some argue that frontloading those losses goes against the “matching” concept 
whereby “expenses are recognized in the income statement on the basis of a direct association 
between the costs incurred and the earning of specific items of income”.31 However, as 
opposed to interest income which accrues ratably for a group of loans considered as a 
whole, credit losses tend to materialize “all at once” for individual loans within the portfolio, 
following some kind of pattern in response to the group’s behavioral characteristics and 
environmental factors.32
More generally, useful information to users of financial statements requires the financial 
performance of any reporting entity to be reflected by “accrual accounting”. Application of 
the “accrual” concept to the business of retail lending, and more generally informational 
objectives demanded of a bank’s financial statements, represent another myth whose 
analysis belongs in the following section. 
Many accountants and accounting standard setters argue that only by reflecting credit 
deterioration of assets in a portfolio can loan-loss recognition be considered “proper” 
accounting.33 Once again, the nature of retail lending counters that belief.
One of the lessons from the financial crisis is risks can build up in portfolios way ahead of 
their formal acknowledgment by management, enforcers, or even prudential authorities. 
Failure to promptly recognize their expected impact can lead to important hits on the 
income statement. Concentration of exposure to cyclical sectors, such as the development 
and construction industries, irrational growth strategies, or lenient underwriting practices, 
are but a few examples of situations where loss information is available well before credit 
deterioration is evidenced. Making use of that information to appropriately depict the 
impact of such exposures appears essential if the bank’s financial position is to be 
conveyed.
Obviously this means broadening the scope of data used, including information on current 
and expected conditions affecting the factors that determine expected cash shortfalls. 
Such exercise of incorporating “forward-looking information” may lead to estimates that 
turn out to be even more subjective than those under the present, incurred loss model, and 
some may consider it inadequate due to the potential for earnings management.34 As 
discussed in Section 2, in recognizing loan losses earnings can be managed by either their 
deferral or anticipation (understatement or overstatement of the allowance). The best tool 
accountants can use to avoid either is accrual accounting, which “depicts the effects of 
transactions and other events and circumstances on a reporting entity’s economic 
resources and claims in the periods in which those effects occur, even if the resulting cash 
receipts and payments occur in a different period”.35
6 “Good-old” accounting
31  See the IASB Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting, Paragraph 4.50. According to the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (2013), interest revenue is recognized only as time passes, while not all 
credit losses occur at inception.
32  According to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (2013), credit losses for retail loans are often “very low 
shortly after origination, rise rapidly in the early years of a loan, and then taper to a lower rate until maturity”.
33  See American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (2013) and International Accounting Standards Board 
(2013b).
34  Recommendation 1.4 of the Report of the Financial Crisis Advisory Group (2009) underscored the need to avoid 
fostering earnings management if an expected loss model was pursued in replacement of the incurred loss 
framework.
35 IASB Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting, Paragraph OB17.
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Credit losses are indeed evidenced following a transaction or event, so in order to avoid 
earnings management they must be recognized when they occur, irrespective of cash 
shortfalls that are finally confirmed. But determining the moment in which loan losses 
accrue requires considering the nature of the causal transaction or event. Could it be the 
case that a bank was completely unaware of circumstances affecting repayment prospects 
for a loan or portfolio of loans until default? With default being usually defined on the basis 
of a borrower’s delinquency during a specified period of time (e.g., 90 days), that would 
certainly seem strange, except probably in the absence of any process for the identification 
and ongoing monitoring of credit risk.
If default cannot be considered the causal event, it is the likelihood of an event resulting in 
default and ensuing cash shortfalls that matters. So called “loss events” in the incurred 
loss framework provide such link. They include delinquency, but also the borrower’s 
financial difficulty, or the granting of concessions.36 However, despite their connection with 
eventual cash shortfalls, those events cannot be considered cause of the loss, but rather 
the consequence of an advanced stage of deterioration resulting from previous causing 
transactions or events. Such evidence of deterioration allows reliable estimation of future 
shortfalls, but as mentioned above risks can build up in a portfolio well before any particular 
borrower misses a single payment (delinquency, and eventual default) or shows any sign 
of alert (other loss events). And in many of those situations information is available allowing 
adequate estimation of losses. So how early can losses be recognized? Could it even 
reach the moment of loan origination?
When determining the range of “events and circumstances” capable of triggering losses 
banks should pay attention to the peculiarities of their retail lending business, as described 
in the previous sections. This means considering not only factors that affect particular 
borrowers or the effect of macroeconomic variables, but also circumstances specific to 
the entity (such as one-off growth strategies aimed at gaining volume) or the transaction 
(like the existence of terms that artificially stretch borrower affordability, for instance by 
deferring payment of principal). In both cases, there is in fact a risk that bad borrowers are 
attracted, so loan origination in itself represents the loss event.37 
However, those are not the kind of factors bank managers tend to look at when estimating 
loan losses. The fact they are not considered despite their potentially huge, estimable 
impact alerts on the need for something to be changed. It may well be the approach to 
when a loss is incurred,38 but accountants seem to be tied to a conceptual link between 
credit quality deterioration and the suffering of the loss.
The alternative is moving past the loss event notion as currently interpreted. Instead of 
telling readers of financial statements when the loss is incurred, accrual would be 
responding to a mere expectation of a loss event taking place in the future likely resulting 
in currently estimable cash shortfalls. In other words, even if the origination of loans under 
36  See IAS 39, paragraph 59.
37  A growing concern of investors is that loan-loss allowances are only responsive to credit quality deterioration. 
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (2013) has echoed analysts suggesting that reserves are “built as 
volume grows, not just as things deteriorate”. This concern is backed by the results of empirical studies 
suggesting that loan growth represents an important driver of bank risk. An example can be found in Foos, 
Norden and Weber (2007).
38  Concerns on the “too little, too late” loss recognition and the need to incorporate a broader range of information 
may well have been appeased within the current incurred loss model by considering factors like those 
mentioned above when estimating and recognizing loan losses. This opens the question whether a real need 
existed to replace the framework. After all loss accrual would still be responding to an event, even if it turned 
out to be mere loan origination based on certain conditions.
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particular circumstances is not assumed to be a loss event in itself, there is no doubt it has 
a likely financial impact that can be estimated, so losses would be recognized because 
they would in fact accrue.
In any case, if the informational needs of investors are to be met the impact of risks that 
build up in a portfolio must be adequately recognized even before any sign of credit 
deterioration shows off. Clearly some common situations that drive the performance of 
retail exposures are not being considered as loss events, so revising the traditional notion 
of when a loss accrues turns crucial in the context of retail lending.  
Previous sections try to demonstrate how the special features of a bank’s retail lending 
business drive risk accumulation, affecting pricing and loan-loss provisioning. A number of 
factors can lead bank managers to disregard prudent underwriting, and obviously the 
resulting risk buildup has to be translated into financial statements.
The mechanics whereby credit risk affects a banking institution are straightforward: 
1 Upon origination or purchase of a financial asset, a bank accepts credit risk 
and its exposure to credit losses increases; in turn, repayments reduce such 
exposure.
2 The loss estimate is a function of both the probability of an event or events 
resulting in cash shortfalls, and the extent of those shortfalls.
3 In turn the probability of such events occurring depends on the factors that 
are determined to affect repayment prospects.
Things get more complex when considering the economic context within which loans are 
underwritten. During good times repayment prospects look bright, risks are underestimated 
and banks sacrifice prudence on the hands of volume: bad loans are originated. Later on 
borrowers start missing payments and managers are left no option but to recognize losses 
that were built up in the wake of such euphoria: income statements are hit, and even a 
sound bank can go under if the market understands that bad loans are eating up capital.
Instead of figuring out the factors behind that behavior, many blame current accounting 
standards of being pro-cyclical. By requiring an event to trigger the loss, they delay its 
recognition fueling further loan growth and adverse selection in good times, and forcing 
managers to lift up the carpet at bad times, thus jeopardizing the bank’s financial position 
and discouraging lending. This belief has translated into calls for loan-loss provisioning to 
act as a countercyclical mechanism.39 
Investors make use of available information to determine bank expected losses. It is clear 
that borrower payment capacity is overestimated during upturns, and some prudential 
authorities have sought to make that apparent in the financial statements even within the 
incurred loss framework.40 Financial stability concerns are the common reason used to 
justify this regulatory requirement. However, arguments presented in the previous section 
make it clear that the link between credit growth and loan-loss accrual needs to be made 
explicit on the face of financial statements. The mere idea of pursuing any kind of economic 
7 Good times, bad times
39  Wall and Koch (2000) described this as the regulatory approach to loan-loss accounting.
40  It is the case of the Spanish “dynamic provisioning” mechanism.
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result through biased use of accounting standards collides with information needs of 
investors, but recognizing the impact of lenient practices observed during upturns is 
connected with adequate accrual accounting and not with the will to ensure a buffer.41
Advocates of the preparer approach to loan-loss accounting have also raised arguments 
based on alleged macroeconomic implications of the user approach. In their view, forcing 
to recognize expected losses would impose an excessive burden on banks and may have 
the effect of discouraging long-term lending. The need to anticipate the recognition of 
losses that may be expected to materialize far-off in the future could tempt banks to 
concentrate on the shorter horizons, especially during good times, fueling the pro-
cyclicality of their lending business.
It is true that an eventual new player in the banking industry could be discouraged to 
embark in long-term finance if forced to recognize losses based on mere peer data or 
theoretical assumptions. However, as described in Section 3 banking is a mature industry 
with severe entry restrictions. Owing to its peculiarities, the retail business is especially 
dominated by big, traditional banks, precisely those whose managers make the argument 
on possible restrictions to long-term finance. Those “century-old” institutions are in fact 
conducting analyses to infer economic losses for the purpose of determining capital 
requirements, and the referred arguments seem to forget expected losses could actually 
be close to nil if loans are prudently underwritten or priced commensurate to risks taken.
Clearly lifetime-loss recognition would affect the growth model pursued during the last 
decades, but is long-term lending to be guaranteed at the expense of loose underwriting 
standards, adverse selection, and an overall increase in leverage levels of households and 
companies with no reflection in the financial statements of banks?
In any case, the debate does not affect the bottom line that knowing the portfolio’s 
economic value is useful for investors. 
Going back to the introduction, the accursed summer of 1854 laid down the foundations 
for a new approach to the study of diseases, based on analysis of that outbreak’s pattern. 
Inconclusive evidence out of samples pumped out was complemented by the fact that a 
vast number of cases of contagion packed in the pump’s vicinity, indicating an obvious 
correlation and thus establishing an indirect, yet effective method for determining the 
causes of the epidemic.
The same sort of indirect method is applied to the estimation of loan losses. Such 
estimation has traditionally been based on elaborate statistical models that measure the 
effect of credit risk through probabilities of default (PDs), credit ratings, or loan 
classifications. The models not only examine levels for those measures, but also the 
probabilities of those levels migrating favorably or unfavorably over time.42 For instance, 
loss estimates will likely be higher for a portfolio showing higher probability of performing 
loans moving to a delinquent status.
Credit risk modeling frameworks for retail loan portfolios include scorecard, roll-rate and 
vintage methods,43 as well as loss-rate methods and provision matrixes.44 If based on 
8 Information shortfalls
41  The proposed framework in Section 9 develops this idea.
42 An explanation of the rationale behind such models can be found in Ryan (2007), pp. 95-97.
43 See Henderson (2009).
44 See Financial Accounting Standards Board (2013).
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quality inputs, they are assumed to provide reliable estimates for loan losses. Is this 
another myth?
Those statistical models are conceptually based on solid (close to 1) “coefficients of multiple 
correlation”, which in this case measure how well expected losses can be predicted using 
a linear function of a set of variables such as PDs or the likelihood of loans migrating from 
performing to non-performing status. For the method of multiple correlation to be useful in 
predicting any kind of economic outcome it must be based on extensive populations of 
complete, measurable, and independent historical data. Moreover, the qualitative character 
of the causal relations must be clear before arriving at quantitative conclusions.45 
Some of those conditions are not met by historical data (e.g., on actual cash shortfalls or 
write-offs) from which PDs, credit ratings or migration probabilities are derived. Those 
inputs are but a partial selection of all factors affecting repayment, merely capable of 
reflecting the historical propensity to repay of borrowers comprising the portfolio, as 
opposed to their current and future ability to perform. Additionally, whereas those inputs 
can readily and objectively be measured, shortfalls are not independent of one another: a 
borrower incapable of meeting payments on a loan is most likely to default on the 
remaining, and defaults within a group of loans tend to be driven by the same factors (e.g., 
unemployment).
On the other hand, it is seldom that extensive data populations can be found. Fortunately, 
borrowers normally meet their obligations, so the variables used to infer expected losses 
have to be put together out of scarce, incomplete, interdependent data. Contrary to the 
widespread confidence in statistical models, this is very likely bound to unreliable outcomes.
As regards the qualitative aspects of the underlying causal relationships, it is very difficult 
to grasp many of the links at work. For instance, historical cash shortfalls may have arisen 
due to “life events” (e.g., death, illness, or divorce), or may reflect an unaffordable lifestyle 
facilitated by instrument-driven incentives.46 While the latter can be used to infer future 
shortfalls, life events cannot be captured by an automated system and translated into a 
quantitative measure, except probably if the objective was to measure the actuarial risk.
Moreover, individual assessments that consider any of those factors necessarily result in 
late recognition of losses. This makes it necessary for banks to collectively analyze 
borrowers on the basis of factors that drive directionally consistent responses for similar 
groupings of loans. In any case professional judgment is required to adjust for any kind of 
qualitative factor, whether it affects individual borrowers or groups thereof.
Considering all those hurdles, it seems clear that statistical models can only do so much. 
When available, historical experience should be considered a starting point to inform the 
loss estimate. Even if conclusive on the trends and behavioral patterns leading to observed 
defaults of borrowers comprising a loan portfolio, the data have to be complemented with 
borrower-related, transaction-specific and environmental information, both current and 
forward-looking.47 
45 References to such requirements date back to Keynes (1940).
46 See Financial Stability Board (2011).
47  As stressed by Pérez Ramírez (2011), p. 294, “the regulatory framework ensuing Bretton Woods reduced 
volatility in interest and exchange rates in such a way that banking activity became essentially devoted to the 
assessment of credit risk”, and therefore “linked to a qualitative analysis of a borrower’s personal qualities 
rather than theoretical quantitative models”.
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Met with all such information, sound management judgment is crucial to qualify and 
determine how each factor affects expected performance. Does it mean the numbers 
pumped out of statistical models are necessarily unreliable? Not at all. Estimations are 
inherent to financial information, so banks should devote every effort to arrive at 
estimates for expected losses without using the lack of quality data as an excuse in such 
endeavor. In fact, as already mentioned many resources are currently invested in inferring 
capital requirements for credit risk exposures, irrespective of the questionable 
effectiveness of statistics in estimating the impact of credit risk, and even if capital is 
meant to absorb the unexpected losses, which are by definition the statistical outliers of 
a loss distribution.
The lack of comparability cannot be argued as a setback for those estimations either. 
On the contrary, knowing not only the differing allowance amounts of different banks, but 
also how they get to the numbers can prove very useful to investors and prudential 
authorities, by providing an insight to each bank’s business model and the different ways 
of managing credit risk. Notes to the financial statements and management reports are 
suitable channels to convey such information and thus contribute in enhancing 
transparency.
Challenges to common beliefs presented in the previous sections provide the grounds for 
a solid loan-loss recognition framework that enhances transparency on the value of loans 
and facilitates the adoption of decisions.
As advanced in the introduction to this article, the framework would not only facilitate 
decision-making by investors. Management would also benefit from more transparent 
information on the bank’s financial position in adopting the decisions best suited to deal 
with troubled assets. But most importantly, this framework would contribute in guiding the 
assessments leading to corrective action by prudential authorities.
The framework revolves around the underlying assumption that loan losses accrue as 
credit risk builds up in respect of a loan or a group of loans. This assumption follows from 
a rational interpretation of the accrual principle in the context of the retail lending business 
of banks, and leads to the following components of the framework:
Component 1
The impact of credit risk needs to be recognized as soon as reasonable and supportable information 
on borrower ability and willingness to pay is available, and as long as such information allows the 
reliable estimation of such impact.
Loan losses are best depicted if estimated and recognized based on the fundamentals of 
accounting. The needs of investors, management and prudential authorities are covered if 
information is focused on the estimation of asset values, in turn based on expected cash 
flows. In the case of loans, the amount and timing of those cash flows are dependent on 
the borrower’s ability and willingness to pay, so useful information should incorporate the 
estimated impact of every factor affecting repayment.
In this connection, loan impairment should no longer be triggered by loss events but rather 
the mere expectation that an event will result in measurable cash shortfalls.
9  A suggested 
framework for loan-
loss recognition
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Component 2
Credit risk is monitored, and resulting losses are estimated, based on evidence that risk factors will 
result in future events likely leading to the shortfall. 
Representing decreases in economic benefits, the estimated impact referred to above is 
to be regarded as a loss resulting from the bank’s expected inability to recover the whole 
of the amount lent plus interest.
Relevant factors are those capable of affecting repayment prospects (as judged by borrower 
capacity, capital or character) either individually or collectively for a group of similar loans.
Component 3
When available, historical experience provides the basis for identifying risk factors…
Behavioral patterns and trends surface the events and circumstances that eventually lead 
to cash shortfalls, as well as the process for such translation. This is valid both for individual 
loans and groups thereof.
Component 4
… based on adequate portfolio segmentation in order not to delay loss recognition…
However, in determining when to recognize loan losses on their retail loans, some banks 
claim to only be capable of monitoring credit risk by tracking the past-due status of 
individual borrowers. This is due to difficulties in establishing causal relationships between 
qualitative factors affecting repayment and cash shortfalls.48 In effect, it amounts to 
recognizing losses upon each borrower’s default.
As described in Section 6, being based mainly on individual borrower delinquency, default 
represents a lagging indicator of problems in a loan portfolio. This means bank managers 
should not rely on loan-loss measures based on default to get rid of bad assets or adopt 
risk transformation strategies. Neither should prudential authorities wait until evidence of 
delinquency to adopt corrective actions. Moreover, with loan losses being based on default 
the disciplinary role of market prices would have no impact on the efficient allocation of 
resources among different banks. In fact, it would benefit banks with a more lenient stance 
towards credit risk management.
The question then arises how to estimate, and when to recognize losses if delinquency 
cannot be used as a practical simplification. It is precisely in those cases when the 
collective assessment of historical information, in a way similar to Dr. Snow’s analysis of 
the epidemic’s pattern, best serves the purpose. Management should be able to segment 
borrowers subject to similar capacity, capital and character and, based on the historical 
trends and patterns of such groupings identify the factors more relevant to the eventual 
default and resulting cash shortfalls of borrowers within.
Component 5
… and subject to loan-loss estimates incorporating the impact of current and expected conditions.
In order not to restrict the estimation to factors representative of the historical propensity 
to pay, judgment should be exercised to adequately incorporate the effect of current and 
48  Considerations on the qualities of the information set used for the estimation of loan losses have been discussed 
in Section 8.
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conditions for new consumer loans by increasing LTV caps to 
90% from the general 70% set at the level of the whole 
consumer-loan portfolio, and offering a standardized 15-year, 
amortizing loan at a 3.5% interest rate.
Initial loan-loss estimation
Faced with the described fact pattern, what elements would 
management consider when estimating loan losses?
Step 1. Loan segmentation
The scores for consumer-loan borrowers in the region show a high 
degree of commonality in their repayment capacity, and very little 
Fact pattern
— Bank A is focused on retail lending. It embarks into a new 
consumer lending business.
— Part of that business is conducted in a specific rural area.
— Considering the trend in government policies for the region, 
the economic outlook looks favorable.
— Many banks and lenders are embarked in a similar business in 
the region, which is driving margins down. Bank A cannot 
compete through price (more specifically, it cannot set the 
interest rate below 3%), so management decides to relax the 
BOX 2INITIAL LOSS ESTIMATION BASED ON COMPONENTS 1-6. AN EXAMPLE
expected conditions on the mechanisms for the translation of identified risk factors into 
final cash shortfalls. This is what the revised standards of the IASB and FASB refer to as 
“forward-looking information”.
Component 6
Estimating loan losses requires looking beyond priced-in loss expectations to determine how the quirks 
of retail lending affect the value of loans.
Among current and expected conditions referred to above, a prominent role should be 
reserved to underwriting practices that steer the features of loans within the group.
It follows from the discussion on pricing and fair value in sections 4 and 5 that the nature 
of retail lending prevents the particular features of a transaction from being considered 
when estimating loan losses. Although banks may be looking at character, capacity and 
capital when categorizing borrowers, it would seem odd if they took loan conditions into 
account. Otherwise they would be reducing the amount lent to compensate for risks 
introduced by features intentionally built into the transactions to compete for share.49 
This means that, irrespective of a bank’s risk appetite, it is unlikely that the estimated 
impact of dubious terms in the transactions is priced into the loans through the appropriate 
premium. The same would be true of undue growth strategies, which have historically 
evidenced a strong correlation with ensuing cash shortfalls.
So in effect, many of those transaction-related characteristics linked to commercial goals 
have no reflection in the financial statements despite their impact on borrower incentives 
to perform, and thus on expected cash flows and the loan’s fair value.
Accounting cannot be expected to solve or mitigate the harmful consequences of 
imprudent lending, but it must put them forward to the markets. Accordingly, all those 
conditions should be considered in estimating loan losses. 
The approach described up to now can better be understood through a practical example.
49 Valid exceptions to this would be cases in which market for loans incorporating those features existed.
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BOX 2INITIAL LOSS ESTIMATION BASED ON COMPONENTS 1-6. AN EXAMPLE (cont´d)
Step 4. Historical data as a starting point for the estimation of loan 
losses
Data on cash shortfalls for 10 year auto loans are available for a 
period spanning the last 20 years. They show cash shortfall rates 
averaging a yearly 4% during the first 3 years of a loan’s life, and 
raising to 8% from year 4 onwards.
Step 5. Adjustment to current conditions
On average, the bank has been capping LTV on consumer loans to 
70%. Increasing the cap to 90% is likely to increase borrower 
incentives to default, so the historical loss rate is adjusted 
proportionally to arrive at foreseen cash shortfalls.
As a result, a yearly 5.14% rate of cash shortfalls [4%×(0.90/0.70)] 
is projected three years onto the future, while a 10.29% rate 
[8%×(0.90/0.70)] is projected for years 4 to 8. The 4% rate is used 
for the remainder of the loan’s life, since the bank is unable to 
reasonably forecast repayment for loans that far onto the future 
based on available information.
Step 6. Judgmental overlay
Management considers prospects for increased subsidies to invite 
non-trustworthy individuals asking for loans. The related impact 
on character is considered to compensate enhanced capacity 
stemming from the increase, so the rates determined in step 5 are 
not adjusted further.
Step 7. Initially expected loan losses (= 4 + 5 + 6)
As a result of the previous steps, a 5.14% annual rate is applied to 
years 1 to 3, with a 10.29% rate for years 4 to 8, and 4% being 
applied from year 9 to 15.
capital. As a result, management understands that defaults, and 
ensuing cash shortfalls, should respond similarly to a common 
range of credit risk factors.
Based on that understanding, the region’s consumer-loan business 
is defined as a segment for risk-assessment and loss-estimation 
purposes.
Step 2. Reference portfolio
This business being new, management must determine whether 
any existing portfolio can be used as reference. The reference 
portfolio should be characterized by credit risk factors similar to 
those expected to affect the analyzed segment.
The bank identifies an existing auto-loan portfolio in that same 
region. The reduced equity buffer provided by the attached 
collateral (motor vehicles) makes cash shortfalls on that portfolio 
highly correlated to borrower defaults. Accordingly, the portfolio is 
considered a valid reference for the analysis of consumer loans in 
the region (which by definition are not collateralized).
Step 3. Identification of credit risk factors
A clear pattern in the reference portfolio is identified whereby 
borrower defaults leading to historical cash shortfalls basically 
respond to government cuts in subsidies to agricultural output. 
This is due to the fact that the payment capacity of auto-loan 
borrowers (most of which are closely linked to farming activity) is 
highly dependent on those subsidies due to the low productivity of 
farm land.
Accordingly those subsidies are identified as the sole determinant 
factor in the eventual occurrence of defaults and the resulting cash 
shortfalls.
These initially expected losses should feed directly into the price of loans through the 
appropriate risk premium. Otherwise a day-one loss should be recognized to adjust the value 
of loans accordingly.
But even if neither action was adopted by management, knowing how credit risk is identified, 
and the mechanics through which risk factors lead to ensuing cash shortfalls facilitates the 
external monitoring of credit risk and verification of the allowance level by auditors, investors 
and supervisors. It therefore allows early adoption of corrective action and forces managers 
to improve their credit risk management and internal control frameworks.
As described in the example’s fact pattern, Bank A cannot compete through price, but the 
situation forces its managers to raise the bar on LTVs and set a 3.5% rate. Would that price 
cover initial loss expectations? If not, what would be the adequate pricing? How could the 
value adjustment be determined, either at day one or as soon as information on the mispricing 
was available?
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10,000€ = Annual constant installment × a153.96%
Annual constant installment ≈ 897€
Such installment would cover loss expectations so that the net 
cash flows provide the expected 3% return. Theoretically, loans 
yielding 3% and above (up to 3.96%) would compensate the 
shortfalls stemming from the non-performing.
Step 12. Actual pricing (looking beyond priced-in loss expectations)
Even if Bank A cannot set the rate below 3%, the tightening of 
margins by competitors forces a response in terms of pricing, 
besides the LTV measure adopted to attract borrowers. So the 
bank sets a 3.5% rate for all consumer loans in the segment.
With the risk premium falling short of that required to cover initially 
expected losses, cash flows from performing loans no longer 
suffice to compensate shortfalls expected on the non-performing.
So the bank ends up offering 10,000€, 15 year, amortizing, fixed 
3.5% rate loans, with a final contractual installment of 868€ 
(instead of the 897€ that would cater for risk expectations).
10,000€ = Annual contractual installment × a153.5%” 
Annual contractual installment ≈ 868€ 
“Ideal” step. Recognition of the value adjustment
The fair value of an average loan within the segment would result 
from discounting the expected cash flows (contractual cash flows 
net of expected shortfalls) at the risk-free rate (3%).
Annual expected cash flows = Annual contractual installment – 
Annual expected cash shortfall = Annual contractual installment – 
(Annual constant installment – Minimum annual cash flow) = 868€ 
– (897€ – 838€) = 809€ 
Fair value = 809€ × a153% ≈ 9,658€ 
So a 342€ value adjustment (the difference between the 10,000€ 
lent and fair value) would be necessary for each single loan within 
the group. This reflects the cost for keeping up with competitors, 
and results from discounting the un-priced expected losses, i.e. 
those resulting from lending at a premium (0.5%) falling short of 
that required to cover all loss expectations (0.96%). The latter 
would result in 897€ installments, while the former results in 868€ 
installments, so the un-priced loss amounts to 29€ per year (897€ 
– 868€).
Value adjustment = 10,000€ – 9,658€ ≈ 342€ ≈ 29€ × a153%
The seven steps of the example in Box 2 lead to the determination 
of initially expected loan losses. An adequate risk management 
policy would ensure those losses were correctly priced.
Step 8. Determination of minimum annual cash flows required to 
meet the expected yield
According to management, Bank A would not be able to set the 
price for its consumer loans in the region below 3% if it were to 
compensate for the time value of money, funding costs, and 
overheads. As indicated above, this prevents it from competing 
via price, and forces a relaxation in other loan conditions.
For an average 10,000€ loan with a 15-year term, the 3% yield is 
used to calculate annual cash flows that the bank would expect to 
obtain, at a minimum, from each loan in the group. However, those 
cash flows would in no case cover loss expectations.
10,000€ = Minimum annual cash flow × a153%
Minimum annual cash flow ≈ 838€ 
Step 9. Grossing-up of cash flows
The foreseen cash shortfalls shown in step 7 (Box 2) are projected 
for each appropriate period of the loan’s life and added to the 
minimum required cash flows, resulting in grossed-up amounts.
Adjusted annual cash flow (years 1-3) = 838€ / (1-0.0514) = 883€
Adjusted annual cash flow (years 4-8) = 838€ / (1-0.1029) = 934€
Adjusted annual cash flow (years 9-15) = 838€ / (1-0.04) = 873€ 
Step 10. Determination of the adjusted yield (theoretical pricing)
Using those cash flows, the adjusted yield is calculated, representing 
an internal rate of return that adequately incorporates initial loss 
expectations for the group of loans considered as a whole.
10,000€ = [883€ × a3i] + [(1+i )-3 × 934€ × a5i] + [(1+i )-8 × 873€ 
× a7i ]
i ≈ 3.96%
In other words, an approximate 0,96% risk premium would have to 
be priced into each originated loan for the bank to break even in 
terms of initial loss expectations.
Step 11. Equivalent annual constant installment
A constant installment can be calculated based on the adjusted yield.
BOX 3LOAN PRICING AND VALUE ADJUSTMENT
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Besides mispricing, a value adjustment would also be required if expected losses were 
inadequately estimated due to involuntary risk understatement.
Component 7
The estimation and recognition of expected loan losses in response to credit growth or lenient 
underwriting responds to the underlying assumption in this framework (“loan losses accrue as credit 
risk builds up in respect of a loan or a group of loans”), so it should not be understood as a way of 
creating a countercyclical buffer, or a means of attaining any other macro-economic purpose.
According to Hoogervorst (2012a), accounting standard setters cannot “develop 
standards that make items appear to be stable when they are not”. This statement 
reflects the traditional reluctance of accounting standard setters in accepting what Wall 
and Koch (2000) define as the regulatory approach to loan-loss recognition, which 
follows the perception that prudential authorities are usually biased towards excess 
conservatism.50
However, this perception has to be qualified in the context of the peculiarities of the retail 
lending business of banks. Excess optimism and the according underestimation of credit 
risk is particularly common in favorable economic contexts, but the need to consider the 
related impact when estimating loan losses should not be branded as a way of attaining 
“rainy-day” buffers aimed at making loans and loan portfolios appear as stable. Rather, it 
should be viewed as the response to a verified correlation between relaxed practices 
resulting from such undue optimism and ensuing problems.
After all, as discussed in Section 7 any macro-economic consideration has to be decoupled 
from strict loan valuation. Moreover, prudential authorities are legally enabled to require 
banks whichever additional information they deem necessary, so their approach to loan-
loss provisioning should not be considered different to an economic view.
Component 8
In estimating loan losses sound management judgment should be given prominence over statistical 
methodologies. 
Management judgment should play the key role in determining how risk factors affect 
expected performance. While historical information serves as a starting point in the 
assessment, estimations are inherent to financial information and particularly relevant in 
the area of loan-loss provisioning.
In this connection, banks should not be allowed to use lack of quality data as an excuse 
for not devoting their best efforts in estimating losses.
However, the role of enforcers (mainly auditors) and supervisors in challenging loan-loss 
accounting practices by banks will have to be awarded increased importance, owing to: a) 
the described peculiarities of the retail lending business by banks; b) the resulting 
managerial incentive to relax loan conditions; and c) the increased judgmental nature of 
the expected credit loss model in relation to the existing accounting model.
50  See footnote 10.
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Overall result
Arguably if all the above components were considered, this framework would ensure that loan losses 
are recognized not only in response to deterioration of the originally assessed borrower creditworthiness, 
but also due to the way loans are granted.
The proposed framework would lead to indicators of cash shortfalls being based on lenient 
credit practices, changes in the underwriting criteria, growth strategies, or generally 
changes in the approach to risk management, in addition to macroeconomic circumstances 
affecting the loan or group of loans, and the worsening of credit quality.
The argument that upfront recognition of losses that may result from such approach is not 
solid accounting gets around the notion of accrual accounting.51 The allowance should 
reflect collectability concerns on products which expose the bank to increased risks 
relative to traditional loans, and especially those with a higher potential for payment shocks 
(such as those incorporating features like the ones described in Box 1).52 As an example, 
estimated losses on a loan in which the bank’s commitment represents just half of the 
collateral’s value should normally be lower (and be recognized later) than those on another 
in which the same committed amount equals the value of collateral pledged. The same 
differentiation of credit loss estimation and recognition should be expected from loans in 
which the principal amount (and thus exposure to credit loss) is constantly decreasing, as 
compared to others with negative amortization features.
In other words, the impact of any factor affecting a borrower’s ability, propensity or 
willingness to repay has to be estimated, including not only changes in credit quality as 
compared to origination, but also risks that are ignored when pricing loans, or even 
purposefully “priced-out” in order to achieve what Haldane (2009) calls the “geared golden 
goose of finance”.53
Such gearing being ultimately backstopped by public funds, it seems unlikely that bank 
managers admit the expected impact of lenient practices or undue growth strategies that 
are not compensated through pricing or other loan conditions. This requires loan-loss 
accounting to adequately portray such impact. Arguably accounting standards based on 
the proposed framework would achieve such objective.54 Otherwise the implementation of 
those standards by banks should be based on guidelines consistent with the framework. 
Prudential authorities are in a privileged position to develop such guidelines.55 
This is not to suggest an alternative standard for banks, nor a uniform way of arriving at 
loss estimates. Rather it should be viewed as a means of ensuring consistent application 
of the standard by banks.
51  In fact, as stated in the IASB’s Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting (Paragraph 4.40), “assessments 
of the degree of uncertainty attaching to the flow of future economic benefits are made on the basis of the 
evidence available when the financial statements are prepared” so that “for a large population of receivables… 
some degree of non-payment is normally considered probable; hence an expense representing the expected 
reduction in economic benefits is recognized”.
52 See US Regulatory Agencies (2006).
53  As explained in the introduction, banks presumed to be sound could in fact be leveraged up to 50 or 60 times. 
In the words of Haldane, even if “banks may not be special after all”, leverage turns them into a “different 
animal”. That “animal” runs systematically over the cliff of technical bankruptcy, and hence the importance of 
adequately valuing its assets.
54  Following the publication of its revised standard for financial asset impairment in July 2014, the IASB created a 
group aimed precisely at tackling the related application issues (http://www.ifrs.org/About-us/IASB/Advisory-
bodies/ITG-Impairment-Financial-Instrument/Pages/Home.aspx). 
55  See footnote 6.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 158 ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 27
In the same vein, such bank-specific guidance should not be considered incompatible 
with enforcement efforts. While banking supervisors would ensure that regulatory capital 
is placed as a last line of defense against inadequate allowance levels, the existence of 
specific orientation should instill the appropriate incentives on banks to timely recognize 
losses estimated on the basis of a broader range of information. This would help enforcers 
verifying the compliance of loan-loss allowances with the relevant accounting standard, as 
interpreted in the context of the retail lending business of banks. 
While accounting cannot cater for the unexpected, it should strive to determine the value 
impact of features that characterize the retail lending business of banks. Final cash 
shortfalls are obviously uncertain, but it would be cynical of bank managers to refrain from 
their estimation based on that hurdle. In the end, the aim should be to reflect the 
performance prospects of a loan, or a group of loans, on the face of the financial statements.
In the midst of the crisis, Haldane (2009) expressed the view that “a recovery in lending is 
best achieved if banks believe new loans will be profitable”. According to the analysis in 
this article, profitability can be sought in different ways, some of which may bring about 
undesirable outcomes.
After the initial stages of the crisis, credit started recovering through banks engaging in 
risky, uncharted lending based on relaxed conditions to gain volume. Curry (2013) warned 
of the “adverse financial consequences” of banks entering “new lines of business with the 
potential to generate higher profits, but also bigger losses”.
While it is no surprise that the current crisis (like most throughout history) has credit risk in 
its DNA, it strikes to find out that deficiencies in the use of existing information appear to be 
among the main factors at stake. Inadequate application of current accounting standards 
for loan-loss estimation and recognition has clearly contributed to the mess and, disturbing 
as it may seem, many banks are still reluctant to admit what their assets are really worth.
Obviously this should be avoided. Recurring “pandemic” episodes demonstrate the 
inherent fragility of bank balance sheet structures and the quick spillover of any 
institution’s problems. Society cannot afford to periodically bail banks out, so prudential 
authorities must ensure the safety and soundness of banks and protect their depositors. 
Among other measures, that implies responding to transparency concerns by adequately 
informing of a bank’s exposures to credit risk and their likely impact. This means 
providing reliable estimates of loan values, which in turn requires appropriate recognition 
of loan losses.
How can this be done? Identifying risk sources and loss patterns based on historical 
information is a first step, but bank loan losses depend on a wide array of factors affecting 
borrower behavior. Losses accrue as risks build up in the loan portfolio, and a bank can be 
exposed to those risks not only because of credit quality deterioration or visible 
environmental factors, but also well in advance due to the way loans are granted. As 
shown in this article, bank managers have a natural incentive to underprice credit risk.
Accordingly, enhancing the ability to estimate loan losses requires a framework that 
incorporates the anticipated effects of conditions known to affect relevant credit risk 
factors. Taking these conditions on board makes estimation highly judgmental, but the 
usefulness of financial reporting is not based on accuracy, and when it comes to loan-loss 
recognition no statistical model can replace judgment and due diligence.
10  Conclusions: Bumps 
on the road ahead
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In any case the prospects are for a bumpy road. When dissecting the situation of the US 
residential loan business Curry (2013) expressed concerns that might sound familiar at this 
stage of the article:
— “Many home-equity borrowers today face… a balloon payment that will 
require them to refinance or substantially higher monthly payments”.
— Credit risk is “once again on the rise, with relaxed underwriting standards, 
pricing for risk, and more risk layering”.
— “There are steps we need to take to be transparent about the current 
impairment of the loan portfolio”. Those steps include “prudent allowance 
practices consistent with GAAP and regulatory guidance”, and there is a 
“need for revisions in the way banks account for impairment so that bankers 
can start to increase… reserves as the risks in their loan portfolios increase”.
As a disturbing corollary, even if “we are not talking about an imminent crisis” banks now 
face the legacy of lenient practices and their strategy seems to be following past steps 
instead of looking at ways to reinvent their business responsibly.
Most likely, by incorporating all observable information affecting the expected collectability 
of loan cash flows, financial statements will better translate the economics of the banking 
business and enhance transparency. This may incentivize prudent lending through market 
discipline that penalizes banks running on unhealthy strategies. But better information is 
just a piece in the bigger puzzle, which might be useless in the absence of an authority that 
seals the pump and builds drains. Prudential authorities cannot sit on the fence while 
banks trip over the same stone. They should ensure adequate implementation of any 
standard on loan-loss accounting, but also introduce incentives that force bank managers 
to move in the direction of sound underwriting, as common sense requires of companies 
running on so huge leverage levels.
Far from empirics, granting credit deals with individual and social behavior, and thus with 
the errors and passion of human beings. Especially as regards estimation and recognition 
of loan-loss allowances, few thoughts better apply to this craftwork like Joseph Campbell’s 
(1969): “I can see no reason why anyone should suppose that in the future the same motifs 
already heard will not be sounding still… put to use by reasonable men to reasonable 
ends, or by madmen to nonsense and disaster”. 
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